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I. INTRODUCTION
In a society dominated by technology, a cell phone is no longer a luxury, but
a necessity. 90% of American adults own a cell phone, and 64% of American
adults own a smartphone.1 Three-quarters of Americans owning a smart phone
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Legal Studies and History, University of California, Santa Cruz, 2013. I would like to thank my advisor,
Professor Michael Vitiello, for all the time and energy he dedicated to helping me write this comment. I would
also like to thank all of the editors whose sleepless nights made this Comment possible. Finally, I want to thank
my mom and dad. Without them, I wouldn’t be where I am today.
1. Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
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claim to be within five feet of it at all times.2 Twelve percent of users even claim
to use their smartphone in the shower.3 These statistics support the following
assertion made in Riley:
[M]odern cell phones . . . are now such a pervasive and insistent part of
daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were
an important feature of human anatomy.4
Always keeping a cell phone in close proximity, one inevitably carries the
device to and from private places. However, many people are unaware that
carrying this device may allow the government to track their movements down to
the minute.5 Imagining a world where the government has access to a person’s
location every time a cell phone is in close proximity is frightening. Imagining a
world where not only does the government have access to this information, but
can obtain it and use it without probable cause and without a warrant is even
more daunting. Due to loopholes in Fourth Amendment case law, this is not
something we have to imagine.6 This may be the world we live in.7
In Jones, law enforcement officers placed a tracking device below Jones’
vehicle and tracked his movements for 28 days.8 The Court relied on the physical
trespass—the placing of the device underneath the vehicle—to conclude a search
occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.9 However, the Court’s
approach left unanswered whether tracking Jones’ movements on public
roadways without a physical trespass would constitute a search.10 Circuit courts
are split on how to resolve it.11
Circuit court case law reveals tension between the right to privacy and
rapidly evolving surveillance techniques using advanced technology.12 Because
new technology available today is even more invasive than the technology used
in cases like Jones, the Supreme Court needs to address the unanswered question
in Jones to preserve Fourth Amendment protections in this era of emerging
technology. Properly answering this question requires acknowledging the place
cell phones have in a modern society along with a cell phone’s ability to reveal
intimate details about an individual’s private life through his or her location at

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2484.
5. Id. at 2490.
6. Id. at 2494.
7. Id.
8. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 946 (2012).
9. Id.at 949.
10. Id. at 946.
11. See Infra Part III (explaining the circuit split caused by the holding in United States v. Jones).
12. Id.
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essentially any given moment.13 A modern cell phone contains a “digital record”
of almost every aspect of the owner’s life “from the mundane to the intimate.”14
Due to the nature of modern cell phones and the frequency in which they travel
to and from potentially intimate, private places with individuals, law enforcement
use of noninvasive, cell site simulators to discover location information
constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, thereby
requiring probable cause and a warrant.15
This Comment discusses the Fourth Amendment case law involving police
use of surveillance technology leading up to United States v. Jones.16 It then
explains the Jones decision and the question the Supreme Court left unanswered:
When does police use of surveillance technology, absent a physical trespass,
constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?17 This
Comment then addresses the prominent circuit court split regarding whether one
voluntarily discloses his or her location information to a third party through the
use and possession of an operable cell phone, resulting from the unanswered
question in Jones.18
After illustrating the circuit split, this Comment explains why the Supreme
Court should adopt the Fourth Circuit’s approach that one does not voluntarily
disclose location information to a third party simply by using his or her cell
phone.19 Supporting the Fourth Circuit’s approach, this Comment then describes
the invasive nature of cell site simulators law enforcement currently use for
surveillance.20 In short, a cell site simulator essentially “tricks” cell phones in the
surrounding geographical area to send the simulator signals revealing the location
of the cell phone.21 This Comment then highlights the flaws in other circuit’s
approaches.22
Highlighting the highly invasive nature of these devices and the private
information they can potentially reveal,23 it’s unsurprising that use of these

13. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956–57.
14. Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
15. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 350 (4th Cir. 2015).
16. See infra Part II.B (describing the Fourth Amendment case law preceding United States v. Jones).
17. See infra Part II.C (explaining the holding in United States v. Jones and how a physical trespass
allowed the court to leave a question unanswered).
18. See infra Part III (illustrating the circuit split caused by the holding in United States v. Jones).
19. See infra Part IV (elaborating on the numerous reasons the Fourth Circuit’s approach is the most in
tune with modern realities and Fourth Amendment principles).
20. See infra Part IV.A (explaining how certain cell site simulators work without requiring a physical
trespass).
21. See infra Part IV.A (explaining how cell site simulators operate as surveillance devices).
22. See infra Part IV.B (elaborating on how the Fifth and Sixth Circuit’s holding that one voluntarily
discloses location information to a third party by simply using his or her cell phone disregards the realities of
modern cell phones and will erode privacy rights as technology advances).
23. See infra Part IV.C (comparing the nature of the devices employed in the Fourth Amendment cases
preceding Jones and in Jones to new technology).
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devices creates tension between law enforcement and citizens.24 If the Court does
not address the unanswered question, police will continue to utilize these devices
freely and outside the realm of the protections guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment. Citizen outrage and curiosity as to the nature of these devices will
grow.25 Permitting police to exploit this hole in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
by engaging in advanced surveillance technology is a gross deviation from what
the Framers of the United States Constitution intended and takes society back to
the dark days of general warrants.26
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
Section A discusses the critical facts in Jones, including law enforcement’s
use of a global positioning system (GPS) device to track Jones’ movements over
an extended period.27 Section B discusses the Supreme Court precedent that
bound Jones.28 The cases discussed in Section B all involve Fourth Amendment
challenges to the use of warrantless police surveillance technology without
probable cause.29 Section C elaborates on the holding in Jones and explains how
the majority relied on the physical placing of the GPS device on Jones’ car to
find that a search occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.30
Section D highlights the concurring opinions that foresaw the problems the
majority’s reliance would cause future courts when presented with similar facts
absent the physical trespass.31
A. The Facts of Jones
In 2012, Antoine Jones was suspected of trafficking in narcotics and
subsequently became a target of the FBI and local police department.32 The
police department installed a GPS device underneath Jones’ vehicle and tracked
24. See infra Part IV.D (detailing a pending lawsuit against the Sacramento County Police Department as
a result of its use of cell site simulators as part of its investigatory practices).
25. See infra Part IV.D (elaborating on the notion that government agents actively conceal information
regarding these devices, and how citizens are discovering details about the devices’ intrusive nature and
detrimental impact on privacy rights).
26. William Cuddihy, Warrantless House-to-House Searches and Fourth Amendment Originalism: A
Reply to Professor Davies, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 997, 998 (2012).
27. See infra Part II.A (providing the relevant facts of United States v. Jones).
28. See infra Part II.B (elaborating on the existing case law when United States v. Jones was decided).
29. See infra Part II.B (elaborating on the existing case law involving warrantless police use of
technology when United States v. Jones was decided).
30. See infra Part II.C (explaining how the majority in United States v. Jones based their holding on preKatz law governing the Fourth Amendment).
31. See infra Part II.D (explaining how the majority in United States v. Jones based their holding on preKatz law governing the Fourth Amendment, while the concurring opinions saw the issues with this approach in
the modern era).
32. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
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the vehicle’s movements for the next 28 days.33 The location information
obtained from the GPS device placed Jones at an alleged co-conspirator’s house
with over $850,000 in cash and a vast amount of narcotics inside.34 The jury
convicted Jones and the court sentenced Jones to life in prison.35
However, on appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed his conviction.36 The court employed the Katz analysis
and held that when the police tracked the vehicle for 28 days, a search took place
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.37 Therefore, the police action
required probable cause and a warrant.38 The court reached this conclusion
because “a reasonable individual would not expect that the sum of her
movements over a month would be observed by a stranger in public, and this
information could reveal an intimate picture of her life not disclosed by any one
of her movements viewed individually.”39
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held the attachment of the GPS
device to Jones’ vehicle and subsequent use of that device to track the vehicle’s
movements on public roadways constituted a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.40 However, the court did not determine whether the same
police conduct would constitute a search absent the physical trespass, which led
to confusion amongst an already perplexing framework.41
B. The Road to United States v. Jones
The Fourth Amendment provides, “the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause. . . .”42 The case law governing the application of the Fourth Amendment
was complex prior to Jones.43
Common law trespass initially governed the Fourth Amendment cases using
a property-based approach.44 However, after 1967 courts began using the test laid

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 949.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 347 (4th Cir. 2015).
40. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954, 964.
41. Id. at 954 (the court also left open whether law enforcement must obtain a warrant if the same police
conduct, absent a physical trespass, constitutes a search).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
43. See infra Part II.B (explaining the complicated case law existing when United States v. Jones was
decided).
44. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 950.
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out in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States.45 Justice Harlan
explained that a search, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, occurs
when police conduct violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.46 The
Katz test arguably broadens the scope of protections under the Fourth
Amendment, relying on the notion that the Fourth Amendment protects people
rather than places.47 The test no longer relies on whether law enforcement
commits a physical trespass on a constitutionally protected area to decide
whether the government action triggers the Fourth Amendment protections.48
Following Katz, the Supreme Court decided a number of cases applying the
Katz framework to situations involving law enforcement use of surveillance
technology.49 First, in Smith v. Maryland, a telephone company installed a pen
register at the government’s request and used it to discover phone numbers Smith
dialed from inside his house.50 The Court held this action was not a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.51 The Court reasoned that as a subscriber
one realizes, or should realize, phone companies obtain the numbers dialed for
reasons such as billing and keeping business records.52 Further, pen registers
reveal only the phone numbers dialed and not content of communications.53
As a result, the Court concluded Smith assumed the risk the phone company
would reveal the numbers he dialed to the police.54 Using the third party
doctrine,55 the Court held Smith did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
over the numbers he dialed because he voluntarily conveyed that information to
his service provider when he dialed the numbers on his phone.56
In United States v. Knotts, the government installed a radio transmitter in a
container of chloroform, prior to Knotts purchasing the container, and
subsequently tracked the movements of the container on public roads while the
container was in Knotts’ possession.57 The Court in Knotts used the Katz test to
hold the government action did not constitute a search within the meaning of the
45. Id.
46. See id. at 954 (explaining that one must have a subjective expectation of privacy that society is ready
to recognize as reasonable to satisfy the test).
47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
48. Id. at 352.
49. See infra Part II.B (describing the case law that used the Katz test and subsequently shaped the Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence).
50. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
51. Id. at 742.
52. Id. at 741.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 744.
55. See id. (explaining the third party doctrine as the notion that one does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy over information he or she voluntarily discloses to third parties).
56. Id. at 744.
57. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983) (The fact that the beeper was placed in the
container prior to Knotts purchasing it is important because since he did not own the container when the beeper
was installed, the police did not commit a physical trespass, forcing the court to conduct the Katz analysis).
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Fourth Amendment because an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy on public highways where any member of the public can see his or her
movements.58
One year after Knotts, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Karo.59 In
Karo, the government again placed a beeper inside of a container Karo purchased
and tracked the container’s movements.60 However, in Karo the Court held that a
search occurred because unlike Knotts, where the monitoring took place entirely
in public, the monitoring in Karo continued inside the home.61
Following Knotts and Karo was Kyllo v. United States.62 In Kyllo, the Court
held the police use of a thermal-imaging device from a public street to discover
heat emanating off petitioner’s home from a room used to grow marijuana, was a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.63
Using the Katz formula and existing framework developed in the
aforementioned cases, the government in Jones argued that since Jones had no
reasonable expectation of privacy underneath his vehicle and on public
roadways, no search occurred.64 Since these areas were visible to the public, the
government contended that Jones voluntarily relinquished any reasonable
expectation of privacy he may have had.65
C. The Question Left Unanswered in United States v. Jones
Although the Supreme Court in Jones was working under this framework, it
did not apply Harlan’s concurrence in Katz to determine whether a search
occurred.66 By failing to do so, Jones further complicates the framework.67
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that Jones’ Fourth Amendment
rights did not fall within the Katz formulation because the government committed
a physical trespass when they placed the GPS device beneath Jones’ vehicle.68
Because of this, the Court employed the pre-Katz physical trespass test.69 As a
58. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
59. See United States v. Karo, 486 U.S. 703, 703 (1984) (holding the warrantless monitoring of a beeper
in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance from a public space, violates the Fourth
Amendment).
60. Id. at 708.
61. Id.at 714.
62. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding when a device, not in general public use, is
subsequently used to discover details unknown to the public, without a physical intrusion, the surveillance is a
search).
63. Id. at 40.
64. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Ebony Morris, Always Eyes Watching You: United States v. Jones and Congress’s Attempts to Stop
Warrantless Government Surveillance, 40 S.U. L. REV. 489, 490 (2013).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 953.
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result, the Court held that the government’s action of placing the GPS device
underneath the vehicle constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.70
Justice Scalia explained that Katz simply supplemented the previous property
rights and the common law trespass regime governing the Fourth Amendment.71
The court reasoned that a search undoubtedly occurs when the government gains
information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area.72
However, this presented a vexing problem for the concurring opinions.73 The
concurring opinions anticipated facing future situations where there is no
physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, but rather, a situation
involving only the “transmission of electronic signals” in light of rapidly growing
technological advances.74 The majority in Jones explained that such cases will
still be analyzed under Katz.75 However, since Knotts essentially permits a certain
amount of warrantless government surveillance, at what point does this police
conduct become a search requiring a warrant based on probable cause?76 The
majority opinion did not provide any guidance on how to tackle that issue, but
the concurring opinions did.77
D. The Forward-Looking Concurring Opinions
Although concurring in the judgment, Justice Sotomayor provided the critical
fifth vote for the Jones majority. She agreed with the majority’s use of the preKatz physical trespass test, but explained how such a physical invasion
constitutes a constitutional minimum.78 She recognized that because of advances
in technology, many types of police surveillance techniques do not require a
physical trespass to be employed.79 In future cases, where the government does
not commit a physical trespass, Justice Sotomayor explained that she would take
the attributes of GPS devices into account when considering whether there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy “in the sum of one’s public movements.”80
An attribute of a GPS device she would take into consideration is the nature
of the information the device can disclose to the government.81 Justice
70. Id. at 949.
71. Id. at 952.
72. Id. at 955.
73. See Infra Part II.D (elaborating on the concurring opinions in Jones).
74. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012).
75. Id. at 953.
76. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 276 (1983).
77. See infra Part II.D (elaborating on the concurring Justices’ attempt to tackle the issue the majority
opinion ignored).
78. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
79. Id.at 955.
80. Id. at 956.
81. Id.
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Sotomayor explained that GPS devices track one’s public movements, which
may reveal extremely private information such as, a trip to the plastic surgeon, a
trip to the abortion clinic, a trip to the AID’s treatment center, etc.82 She believes
it is foolish to think one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy at
these various locations.83 Further, Justice Sotomayor expressed concern about the
third-party doctrine.84 In her view, this doctrine has no place in the digital age,
where most individuals disclose a vast amount of information about themselves
to third parties through routine and everyday tasks.85
Justice Alito, also concurring in the judgment, agreed with the majority’s
holding, that the police conduct constituted a search, but disagreed with the
majority’s approach.86 He criticized the majority for using “18th-century tort law”
to decide a case involving modern technology and surveillance techniques.87
Alito argued that the current Fourth Amendment case law did not support the
majority’s “superficial” analysis.88 Instead, he analyzed the issue under the Katz
test.89 His argument focused on the flaws of depending on a physical trespass
because, in today’s world, advanced technology and science can create much
more intrusive devices, which do not require a physical trespass to be used
effectively.90 He cautioned that such advances in technology invade privacy more
than ever.91
A significant difference between Justice Alito’s approach and the majority’s
approach has to do with the effect of the Katz test.92 Justice Alito claimed that the
Katz test replaced the physical trespass approach, whereas the majority claimed it
just supplemented the approach.93 Employing the Katz test, Justice Alito
explained how the majority opinion ignored the negative implications of longterm tracking without a physical trespass.94 He claimed that such long-term
monitoring infringes upon a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy under the
Katz test.95 However, Justice Alito did not explain where he would draw the
line.96 How long is long-term?

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 955.
Id. at 957.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 953.
Id. at 958.
Id.
Id. at 962.
Id.at 964.
Id. at 961.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 964.
Id.
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Although Justice Alito claimed four weeks of surveillance with electronic
equipment may cross the line of what constitutes a search and what does not, the
facts of the case did not require the court to answer that question.97 He
recognized that the majority’s approach essentially permits long-term tracking, so
long as the government does not physically trespass on any protected property.98
Justice Alito expressed his concern regarding the grave danger this posed.99 The
circuit court case law following Jones confirmed his fears.100
Justice Alito further elaborated on how trivial the court’s holding was.101
Using the majority’s rationale, if the government attached a GPS device to the
vehicle and tracked the movements for one day, then a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment occurred.102 However, under the majority’s approach,
if the government did not attach the device, but rather, had the police follow
Jones for a long period of time, no search would have occurred.103 The majority’s
approach turned on the simple placement of a small device on the vehicle.104
To enhance his argument, Justice Alito explained some of the ways the
government can track one’s location without a physical trespass.105 For example,
he acknowledged that wireless providers can track and record the location of
cellular devices.106 Under the majority’s approach, the government is permitted to
obtain this information for an extended period without probable cause and a
warrant, so long as no physical trespass takes place.107
Under the majority’s framework, with 322 million wireless phones used in
the United States, law enforcement’s use of highly advanced surveillance
technology to obtain location information gravely diminishes privacy.108 Due to
the nature of modern cell phones and the frequency in which they travel to and
from potentially private places with individuals, law enforcements’ use of
noninvasive, cell site simulators to discover location information triggers the
protections of the Fourth Amendment, thereby requiring probable cause and a
warrant.

97. Id.
98. Id. at 961.
99. Id. at 955.
100. See infra Part III (explaining how circuit courts are employing the United States v. Jones holding
and reaching contradictory conclusions).
101. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 962.
106. Id. at 963.
107. Id.at 962.
108. Id.at 963.
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III. CIRCUIT COURTS’ SPLIT RESPONSE TO UNITED STATES V. JONES
In response to Jones, circuit courts struggled to apply its holding and dicta.109
Since Jones did not address a pressing question, unsurprisingly, a circuit split
arose regarding whether one voluntarily discloses his or her location when
utilizing a cell phone.110
Section A discusses United States v. Skinner, decided shortly after Jones,
where the Sixth Circuit held that Skinner did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in location information emanating from his cell phone.111 Section B
discusses In Re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, where the Fifth Circuit held
that the third-party doctrine applies to cell phone users because they knowingly
and voluntarily disclose their phone’s location information by using their
phone.112 Section C discusses the vacated opinion of U.S. v. Davis, where the
Eleventh Circuit adopted a contrary approach to the Fifth Circuit and held that a
person does not voluntarily disclose his or her location information by using a
cell phone. 113 Finally, Section D discusses the holding in United States v.
Graham, where the Fourth Circuit rejected the notion that cell phone users
voluntarily disclose their location when they turn on a cellular device and use it
in today’s society.114 The Fourth Circuit held that such information is
constitutionally protected under the Fourth Amendment.115 In effect, this holding
supports the notion that law enforcement’s use of noninvasive, cell site
simulators to discover location information constitutes a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, thereby requiring probable cause and a
warrant.
A. United States v. Skinner
Skinner used a “pay-as-you-go phone” that, unbeknownst to him, came with
GPS technology to conduct operations pertinent to transporting illegal drugs.116
Suspecting that Skinner was involved in a large-scale drug trafficking operation,
the government “pinged” his cell phone in order to discover Skinner’s location

109. See infra Part III (explaining the circuit split between the Sixth, Fifth, Eleventh, and Fourth Circuit
because of the issue left unanswered in Jones).
110. Id.
111. See infra Part III.A (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s approach to the question left unanswered in
Jones).
112. See infra Part III.B (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s approach to addressing the question left
unanswered in Jones).
113. See infra Part III.C (discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis regarding whether a person
voluntarily discloses his or her location information to third parties when using a cell phone).
114. See infra Part III.D (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s analysis regarding whether a person voluntarily
discloses his or her location information to third parties when using a cell phone).
115. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344-45 (4th Cir. 2015).
116. United States v. Skinner 690 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2012).
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and track his movements over a three-day period.117 As a result, the police
uncovered Skinner’s location as he transported drugs across state borders.118
After the police obtained the cell phone’s location, they located Skinner and his
son with a motorhome containing over 1,100 pounds of marijuana.119 Skinner
moved to suppress the marijuana on the grounds that the police conduct, leading
to its discovery, violated the Fourth Amendment.120 The district court denied the
motion and convicted Skinner of two counts “related to drug trafficking and one
count of conspiracy to commit money laundering.”121
Holding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, the Sixth Circuit
relied on the idea that a cell phone is a modern luxury.122 It reasoned that if
criminals utilize modern technology while engaging in criminal activity,
criminals “can hardly complain when police take advantage of the inherent
characteristics of those very devices to catch them.”123 The court concluded that
Skinner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the “data emanating
from his cell phone,” which ultimately disclosed his location to the police.124
B. In Re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data
In In Re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, the
court took a similar approach to that in Skinner. In October of 2010, the
government filed three applications under the Stored Communications Act125 to
compel cell phone service providers to turn over historical cell-site information
for certain cell phones over a 60-day period.126 Although the government met the
specific and articulable facts standard set forth in the Stored Communications
Act, the magistrate judge denied the application for historical cell site
information.127 The magistrate judge held that, in light of cell phone technology
and based on Supreme Court precedent, “compelled warrantless disclosure of cell
site data violates the Fourth Amendment.”128

117. Id. at 776.
118. Id. at 774.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 776.
121. Id. at 775.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 774.
124. Id.at 775.
125. Stored Communications Act 18 U.S.C.S. § 2703(d) (2016) (permitting the government to gain
access to cell site information from cell-phone subscribers if the government has “specific and articulable facts”
to support the request rather than probable cause).
126. In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir.
2013).
127. Id.
128. Id.

406

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 48
The government submitted a brief to the district court, and although there
was no adverse party to the Government’s ex parte application, the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was among the group that participated as amici
curiae.129 As a result, the ACLU raised a constitutional challenge to the Stored
Communications Act.130 The district court concluded that the government could
only request location information from cell phone providers if it obtained a
warrant based on probable cause.131 The district judge based this holding on the
rationale that when someone places a call, his or her location information and
other data is constitutionally protected. Deeming the statute unconstitutional, the
district court’s holding supports the notion that one does not voluntarily disclose
his or her location to the service provider when using a cell phone.132
The ACLU argued that the government’s action of gaining access to cell site
records, reflecting activity over a 60-day period, undoubtedly violates an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz.133 Using the notion
from Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Jones to support this argument, the
ACLU reasoned that obtaining the cell site records for over a 60-day period
crossed the line.134 Enhancing this argument, the ACLU analogized the car in
Jones to the cell phone.135 Since most people carry their cell phones on their
person everywhere they go, tracking the movements of the device is much more
invasive and reveals much more sensitive information than tracking the
movements of a vehicle, which people only use for the purpose of getting to and
from a certain destination.136
The court disagreed with the ACLU, and held that the third-party doctrine
applied in this situation by drawing the distinction between business records and
the communications’ content, such as tracking information.137 Since the court
classified the cell site information as a business record maintained and stored by
the service providers, the government argued, and the court agreed, that cell
phone users knowingly disclose their location information to their service
providers when they voluntarily make phone calls.138 This argument relies on the
notion that all cell phone users understand the way in which their phones
operate.139
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The dissent in In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site
Data embraces the notion that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones forces
lower courts to “venture onto uncertain terrain” in applying the Katz analysis to
these law enforcement practices.140 Elaborating on the three separate opinions in
Jones, Judge Dennis disagreed with the majority’s rationale because he deemed
historical cell site location information as potentially protected information under
the Fourth Amendment.141 He argued that since the information is
constitutionally protected, the statute requires the government to obtain a warrant
before compelling such information from service providers.142 The dissent based
its conclusion on the nature of the cell site location information.143
C. United States v. Davis
United States v. Davis presented the Eleventh Circuit with the same issue that
the Fifth Circuit decided one year earlier.144 In Davis, the defendant, Davis, was
charged with “conspiracy to engage in Hobbs Act Robbery” and with
“knowingly using, carrying, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of
violence.”145 Witnesses testified that Davis was involved in various robberies
where the participants all wore masks and carried weapons in an attempt to steal
miscellaneous items and cash.146 Along with testimony explaining Davis’ role in
each robbery, the prosecution also offered evidence that Davis and his codefendants made and received phone calls near the location of each robbery
around the approximate time of the robberies.147
Davis moved to suppress the cell site location information that the
government obtained without a warrant on the grounds that it violated his Fourth
Amendment rights when the prosecution attempted to introduce it at trial.148 The
district court denied Davis’ motion and the jury convicted Davis on all counts.149
On appeal, Davis argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
the cell site location information.150 Davis argued that the Fourth amendment
protects cell site location information.151 As a result, he argued that obtaining

140. Id. at 624 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 629.
143. Id. at 632.
144. See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d. 1205 (11th Cir. 2014) (addressing whether the government
needs probable cause and a warrant in order to obtain cell site location information), vacated, No. 12–12928,
573 Fed.App’x. 925 (Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 2014).
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such information requires probable cause and a warrant.152 However, the
government argued that such information is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment and can be obtained under a court order pursuant to the Stored
Communications Act.153
Recognizing the Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue, the Eleventh
Circuit still used the holding in Jones to formulate its opinion.154 The court began
by analyzing the police conduct. In Davis, the government obtained the location
information pursuant to the Stored Communications Act.155 Cell site location
information makes it possible to discover the location of the user at a particular
time because it contains his or her direction from cellular towers.156
In Davis, the government obtained location information using technology
without committing a physical trespass. The Jones court explained situations
absent a physical trespass “remain subject” to the Katz test. Operating under the
Katz framework, the Eleventh Circuit explained that the Fourth Amendment
protects people from “warrantless interception of electronic data or sound waves
carrying communication.”157 However, it remains unanswered whether the
projection extends to the transmission alone, not revealing content of
communications but revealing location information of the source of the
transmission.158
The court explained that although Jones used the trespass theory to find a
constitutional violation, it recognized the notion that electronically transmitted
location information can be protected by the Fourth Amendment.159 Analyzing
the separate opinions in Jones, the court in Davis concluded that this was an
instance where the Fourth Amendment protects electronically transmitted
location information.160 Therefore, Davis held that the government violated
Davis’ reasonable expectation of privacy when it gathered his cell site location
information without probable cause and a warrant.161
The court used the premise adopted by the Third Circuit to explain its
reasoning.162 In In re Electronic Communications Service to Disclose, the Third
Circuit explained that a cell phone customer does not voluntarily disclose
location information to his or her cell phone provider “in any meaningful way” as
to relinquish his or her reasonable expectation of privacy.163 The court based its
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holding on the disbelief that cell phone users are even aware that their providers
store such information.164
Adopting the Third Circuit’s premise, that one does not voluntarily disclose
location information by making a phone call, the court made the even more
persuasive argument that one does not voluntarily convey anything whatsoever
when they receive a call.165 The court did not find any support for the idea that by
simply placing or receiving a call, the caller is subsequently conveying his or her
location to anyone. The Third Circuit found the third-party doctrine inapplicable
on these facts and concluded that the government must seek a warrant before
obtaining cell site location information.166
D. United States v. Graham
Finally, in 2015, the Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Graham.167 In
Graham, Graham was convicted of “being a felon in possession of a firearm,
Hobbs Act Robbery, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and brandishing a
firearm in connection with all six robberies.”168 The government obtained cell
site location information from Sprint for a 221 day period as part of its
investigation of the robberies.169 The cell site location information revealed that
the defendants were in close proximity to most of the robberies before and after
each robbery took place.170
The government obtained a court order for this information under the Stored
Communications Act.171 As a result, the defendants filed a motion to suppress the
use of this information at trial because the government obtained this information
without probable cause and a warrant.172 However, the district court denied the
motion because the government did not conduct an unreasonable search
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.173 The defendants appealed to the Fourth
Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit found the third-party doctrine inapplicable.174 The court
compared the police conduct in this case to long-term GPS monitoring, which
reveals intimate details of a person’s life based on his or her location.175 It
reasoned that a cell phone user does not voluntarily convey his or her location
164.
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information because a cell phone is constantly conveying this data even when it
is not in use. The nature of a cell phone played a large role in the court’s
holding.176
Analogizing the searches in Kyllo and Karo to the cell site location
information, the court explained that the government can locate an individual at
his or her home along with other private places and not just on public roads.177
Here, since one usually carries the cell phone on one’s person, the location
information discloses the whereabouts of a particular individual rather than the
location of an object, such as a container of Chloroform.178 Further, over 221
days, the appellant was without a doubt home on many occasions, which is the
most sacred protected place under the Fourth Amendment since the adoption of
the amendment itself. Simply because technology has made it possible for a
citizen to carry this device that is capable of revealing location information on his
or her person does not make it any less unworthy of protection under the Fourth
Amendment.179 As a result, the court held that the police action amounts to a
search under the Fourth Amendment, requiring probable cause and a warrant.180
Judge Thacker concurred;181 she reasoned that the third-party doctrine did not
apply because as advances in technology emerge, privacy rights diminish at the
same pace.182 As a result, “each step forward should be met with considered
judgment that errs on the side of protecting privacy and accounting for the
practical realities of modern life.”183 She also stated that a different outcome
permits the government to force service providers to turn over location
information without probable cause.184 Such a notion is preposterous if there is
anything left to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Her argument is
centered on the way in which modern cell phones work. She believes it is
“disturbing” that American citizens can be “tracked from afar regardless of
whether or not [they] are actively using [their] phones.”185
Judge Motz dissented in the judgment on the basis that stare decisis
permitted the police conduct in this particular case without the need of probable
cause and a warrant.186 The dissent believed the third-party doctrine was
controlling on these facts, which meant the protections of the Fourth Amendment
were not triggered.187 Judge Motz analogized the collecting of the location
176.
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information in Graham to the dialed numbers recorded by the pen register in
Smith, and found that the government’s action did not constitute a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.188
IV. TACKLING THE SPLIT: WHY THE FOURTH CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT
Without adopting the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Graham, the Supreme
Court enables law enforcement to use advances in technology to erode the
protections of the Fourth Amendment. To ensure advances in technology do not
deplete privacy protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, law
enforcement use of noninvasive, cell site simulators to discover location
information must constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, thereby requiring probable cause and a warrant.
Section A illustrates the types of devices law enforcement officers currently
use in criminal investigations to discover an individual’s location information.189
Section B discusses the flaws in the Fifth and Sixth Circuit’s contrary approach
as compared to the Fourth Circuit’s holding, and the dangers posed by
unregulated use of cell site simulators.190 Section C discusses a pending lawsuit
against the Sacramento, California, Police Department for its warrantless use of
these problematic devices.191
A. Cell Site Simulators: Stingray, Triggerfish, Amberjack, Kingfish, and
Loggerhead Devices
Devices used by the government during the course of its criminal
investigation designed to gain access to location information are plentiful and
consequently many of them fall outside the scope of existing statutory
regulations.192 Although Congress has not expressly permitted the use of these
technologically-advanced devices, the government utilizes holes in current
legislation and the Fourth Amendment framework to use them anyway.193
Amongst the most common of these devices are cell-site simulators. These

188. Id.
189. See infra Part IV.A (illustrating the types of devices law enforcement officers currently use in
criminal investigations to discover individual’s location information such as cell site simulators).
190. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the flaws in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ holding that one voluntarily
conveys his or her location information to his or her service provider when using a cell phone).
191. See infra Part IV.C (explaining the current lawsuit pending against the Sacramento Police
Department for its use of Stingray devices).
192. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More Than A Pen Register, and Less Than A
Wiretap: What the Stingray Teaches Us About How Congress Should Approach the Reform of Law Enforcement
Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 134, 143 n.2 (2014).
193. Id.
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simulators are called many different names including “stingray,” “triggerfish,”
and “kingfish.”194
Many people may have heard of these devices but have no idea how they
actually work. The reason for that is because many law enforcement officers and
even the manufacturer of these devices, the Harris Corporation, want to keep the
use of these devices concealed from the public.195 The Harris Corporation even
goes so far as to require law enforcement officials to sign non-disclosure
agreements before using the devices.196 What are they so desperate to hide? The
answer lies within the extremely intrusive way these devices operate and the
devices’ ability to reveal sensitive location information at the push of a button.197
These devices essentially transform “a piece of technology so ubiquitous as to be
on the person of practically every citizen” into a real-time tracking device.198
When the government activates the devices, all of the cell phones in the same
geographical area send information directly to those devices. Because cellphones use cell towers to “transmit data,”199 these devices can “trick” the cell
phones into thinking the device is a cell tower, which allows the device to trap
the cell phone’s metadata.200 This metadata includes, amongst a plethora of
information, the location of the cell phone, which as a result, reveals the real time
location of the cell phone user. By acting as a cell phone tower, these devices
force the cell phone to send a responding signal to the device.201 If the device is
within the cell phone’s signal range, it can measure signals from the phone, and
in light of the signal strength, the device reveals the location of the phone.202 By
repeating this and by “collecting the cell phone’s signals from several locations,”
the device can “develop the location of the phone quite precisely.”203

194. In re United States, No. 15M0021, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151811, at *7 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 9, 2015).
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The following chilling conversation highlighted in Andrews brings the highly
invasive nature of these devices to life:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. And so, if a person is inside of a home,
that equipment peers over the wall of the home, to see if that cell phone
is behind the wall of that house, right?
[DETECTIVE HALEY]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And it sends an electronic transmission
through the wall of that house, correct?
[DETECTIVE HALEY]: Yes.204
B. Failing to Recognize the Nature of Modern Cell Phones is Eroding Privacy
Rights
The argument in Skinner, that criminals should not complain when police
take advantage of the “inherent characteristics” of modern technology to “catch
them,” may at first glance seem persuasive.205 However, the reality that the guilty
might benefit from constitutional protections and sometimes “go free” because
the Fourth Amendment conceals incriminating evidence is not a new
phenomenon.206 Although some believe the guilty do not deserve the
constitutional rights, and criminals should not benefit from Fourth Amendment
protections, many constitutional rights are in place to protect the accused.207
Those fearful that criminals using modern technology to partake in criminal
activity will benefit from requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant before
using cell site simulators to access location information, “are not to be aided by
the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
land.”208 In other words, suppressing evidence that is needed to convict the guilty
is the price the legal system pays to protect the rights of the innocent from
arbitrary police conduct while preserving the principles underlying the Fourth
Amendment.

204. Id. at 5.
205. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d, 772, 772 (6th Cir. 2012).
206. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (introducing the exclusionary rule).
207. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law”); id. amend. VI (explaining “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury”); id. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment and excessive
bail).
208. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648.
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Further, by classifying cell phones as “modern luxuries,” the court in Skinner
failed to recognize the nature of cell phones in today’s society.209 Modern cell
phones are hardly “another technological convenience” as Skinner stated.210
Rather, they contain “the privacies of life” for many similar to those contained in
one’s home or office.211
Like Skinner, the Fifth Circuit in In re Application of the United States for
Historical Cell Site Data ignored the modern realities surrounding the cell
phone.212 While all users may understand that their phone must send signals to
cell towers in order to make phone calls, which is then received by the service
provider, it would be ridiculous in today’s society to argue that by doing so and
by simply understanding the mechanics of a cell phone’s ability to place calls, a
person is subsequently relinquishing all privacy rights as to his or her location
when they place a call. This is so because a modern cell phone is much more than
just a telephone.
As Chief Justice Roberts explained, “the term ‘cell phone’ is itself
misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also
happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone.”213 This is true because the
nature of cell phones has evolved dramatically over time. Modern cell phones
can store an immense amount of data including, but definitely not limited to,
photographs, emails, notes, and financial information.214 This large storage
capacity allows a person to carry around the most telling and intimate
information about them that was once physically impossible.215
Another problematic argument is one the Fifth Circuit employed. The Fifth
Circuit elaborated on the notion that using a cell phone is entirely voluntary.216
However, in a world dominated by technology, this is no longer the case. In a
world where 90 percent of American adults own cell phones, an active member
of society must own one as well.217 This is hardly a choice. On this note, the
court makes the additional argument that the government does not require a
person to own a cell phone.218 This argument is naïve and ignores blatant flaws in
such an assertion.219
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The court also argues that the government does not require a person to make
a phone call at a specific location if he or she does not want his or her location
information to be revealed.220 But in the case of the emergency phone call, does a
person really have a choice? If an individual is receiving an emergency phone
call while visiting a location he or she perceives as private, the Fifth Circuit
provides two options. The person can either ignore the call or relinquish any
privacy rights he or she may have over his or her location when answering the
call.221 In today’s world, this should not be a choice one has to make.
The ACLU persuasively argued that advances in technology change society’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.222 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the ACLU,
but explained that a diminution in privacy is an inevitable tradeoff to
technological advances.223 It is frightening to conceive of the fact that the Fifth
Circuit is openly accepting the notion that its holding erodes privacy rights that
are deeply embedded in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. If this type of
government surveillance escapes the bounds of the Fourth Amendment, as the
Fifth Circuit enables it to, society will experience similar diminished privacy
rights to those the citizens in the 1580s faced when courts issued general
warrants.224
General warrants were “indefinite” and provided those executing them with
“limitless” authority to search and seize whatever they please.225 The warrant
executors ransacked homes to obtain incriminating evidence.226 Because the vast
majority of Americans own cell phones, allowing the government to exploit the
nature of these devices essentially permits it to obtain a general warrant to access
each and every American’s location at any given time.227 Since modern cell
phones have such a large storage capacity, they can contain important, private
information that was once only held within the confines of one’s home.228 To
avoid the unwanted general warrant effects, the Supreme Court must recognize
that the use of cell site simulators implicate Fourth Amendment protections.229
When the Eleventh Circuit faced the same issue, it disagreed with the
conclusions the Fifth and Sixth Circuit came to and based its holding on the fact
that one does not voluntarily disclose location information to a third-party
provider by owning a cell phone.230 However, the court vacated its holding soon
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after.231 Although the Eleventh Circuit is rehearing the case, the analysis
conducted in the opinion is worth noting. It is in tune with modern realities and
Supreme Court precedent. The Eleventh Circuit recognizes that the only
information voluntarily conveyed to the phone company when a person places a
call is the numbers dialed.232 Adopting this approach will help curb arbitrary
police activity.
The Fourth Circuit’s approach is most reflective of modern realities, and
preserves the sanctity of the Fourth Amendment.233 In Graham, the court
correctly highlighted the notion that obtaining cell site location information is
much more than simply using a pen register to obtain numbers dialed.234
Collecting and storing location information is a feature embedded in many smart
phones and is enabled automatically when a phone activates.235 Contrary to
physically pressing the buttons on a phone to make a phone call, where one is
conveying numbers dialed to his or her provider, by simply possessing a phone
and standing idly by it, one is not voluntarily conveying anything to anyone.
Obtaining this information reveals a person’s specific movements “down to the
minute.”236
Although the dissent believes the majority in Graham is attempting to “beat
the Supreme Court to the punch,” the Supreme Court left lower courts with little
guidance on how to decide the issue and instead of ignoring the issue, they used
the dicta throughout Jones in an attempt to decide the case.237 Without direct
precedent on point and in light of modern realities, the court used common sense
and focused on the nature of smart phones in 2016. However, the dissent
compellingly pointed out that the Supreme Court needs to revisit the third-party
doctrine and address the long-term cell site location information issues to
eliminate the blatant inconsistencies among the circuit courts’ rulings.238
C. The Stingray’s Harsh Sting
Because these modes of surveillance are much more invasive than those used
in Knotts, Karo, Kyllo, and Smith, the nature of the information they can
potentially reveal is much more private.239 In Kyllo, Justice Scalia acknowledged
the fact that, “it would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy . . . has
231. Id.; See U.S. v. Davis, 573 Fed.Appx. 925, 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (granting rehearing en banc and
vacating U.S. v. Davis).
232. Id. at 1217.
233. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 378 (4th Cir. 2015) (discussing the amount of
information available in cell phones).
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been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”240 Justice Scalia phrased
the issue broadly and explained that the Court in Kyllo had to decide “what limits
there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed
privacy.”241 Cell site simulators reveal, among other information, location data.242
On the other hand, the use of a beeper in Knotts only revealed Knotts’
movements on public roadways.243 While a person driving a car on public
roadways anticipates the public seeing his movements, a person does not
anticipate the public seeing his movements when carrying a cell phone or that the
cell phone is being used as a tracking device.244
In Jones, Justice Alito argued that long-term monitoring of a vehicle’s
movements can violate a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.245 The
Eleventh Circuit accurately explained that when dealing with cell site location
information, an aggregation of movements over a lengthy period of time is not
necessary to establish the invasion of privacy.246 Because “one’s cell phone,
unlike an automobile, can accompany its owner anywhere, the exposure of the
cell site location information can turn a ‘private event into a public one.’”247
Recognizing that Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Jones stood for the
proposition that GPS location information on an automobile is protected only in
the case of “aggregated data,” one may have a reasonable expectation of privacy
over one point of cell site location information.248
Comparing cell site data to communications, which are protected by the
Fourth Amendment, the Court explained that the information is inherently
private.249 In Davis, the court explained the cell site information used by the
government placed Davis near all of the robberies.250 The private nature of the
information is illustrated by the reality that the government’s action could have
placed him “near the home of a lover, or a dispensary of medicine, or a place of
worship, or a house of ill repute.”251
Like Karo, obtaining location information can place someone inside his or
her home, the most sacred, protected place under the Fourth Amendment. In
Andrews, the government, using a cell site simulator, obtained Andrews’ location
and found Andrews seated on the couch in his living room with his cell phone in
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his pants pocket.252 Although using these devices to track a phone will not always
result in locating the phone in a home, “the government cannot know in advance
of obtaining this information how revealing it will be or whether it will detail the
cell phone user’s movements in private spaces.”253
Since it is impossible for law enforcement to determine before using the
various devices to obtain the cell phone user’s location information whether the
user will be in a constitutionally protected area, it is crucial to focus on the nature
of information that can potentially be disclosed.254 Requiring probable cause and
a warrant before employing these devices will protect the private, sensitive
information that could be revealed.255
In Smith, the government used a pen register to discover the numbers Smith
dialed.256 A pen register does not reveal contents of communications.257 Although
cell site simulators technically do not reveal contents of communications either,
the devices can reveal a cell phones’ location and subsequently, a person’s exact
whereabouts.258 The ability to obtain location information is more analogous to
obtaining content of communications rather than simply numbers dialed.
Through the use of these devices, the government is able to determine the cell
phone user’s location, wherever that may be.259
Because of the unregulated use of these devices, anywhere people travel with
their cell phone cannot be kept private. These devices accumulate intimate
information about any person the government chooses to track, which has the
potential to “alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that
is inimical to democratic society.”260 The use of such technology has led to
lawsuits and unease among citizens.
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D. Taking a Stand Against the Use of These Devices: Refusing to Get Stung by
the Stingray
Efforts to hide the use of these devices are slowly unraveling and citizens are
no longer standing idly by now that they are finally aware of these law
enforcement surveillance techniques. For example, in March 2015, the ACLU
sued the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department for the department’s use of the
Stingray device.261 The department assures the Sacramento community that it
uses such devices infrequently in “special” circumstances.262 How does the
public know where the department draws the line? Using these devices in
“special” circumstances without probable cause and a warrant creates a slippery
slope and no guidance for lower courts when deciding what police activity to
condemn and condone.263 It also provides no guidance to police departments
when deciding in which circumstances to use these devices.
Courts are best equipped to determine where the line should be drawn rather
than the police, who have little incentive to draw lines, limiting its ability to
employ these devices. If the Supreme Court requires probable cause and a
warrant to use cell site simulators to obtain cell site location information, there
will be no ambiguity as to when these devices can be employed. Law
enforcement will not be forced to make a judgment call and citizens will be at
ease knowing these devices are employed only after police follow proper
procedures to obtain a warrant.
Further, in Sacramento, the local authorities refused to disclose information
about the use of these devices, which would better the community’s
understanding of them.264 The public has the right to know the extent to which
these highly invasive devices are infringing upon their privacy and constitutional
rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, and the consequences that using
cell phones may have on their expectation of privacy in their location.265
Following the Fourth Circuit’s stance, and adopting the premise that a person
does not voluntarily disclose his or her location information when owning and
operating a cell phone, would require the police to obtain a warrant based on
probable cause before employing these techniques.266 This is not to say police
can no longer utilize these highly effective devices, it is simply ensuring that the
Framer’s intention when creating the Fourth Amendment is not completely
obliterated through the use of such devices. It will ensure Fourth Amendment
protections do not stand still as technology continues to advance.
261. Lang, supra note 199 (elaborating on the allegations the Sacramento County Police Department
faces surrounding its use of the Stingray).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Graham, 796 F.3d at 344.
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V. CONCLUSION
In the past, the protections of the Fourth Amendment were centered on
preserving the sanctity of the home. However, today “a cell phone search would
typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a
house.”267 At a minimum, the Fourth Amendment should protect the same sacred
information it sought to protect when it was adopted, regardless of whether the
information is in a home or contained in a cell phone. In a society where 90% of
American adults own and use cell phones, adopting the Fifth Circuit’s approach
that one voluntarily discloses his or her location information to his or her thirdparty provider, means 90% of American adults relinquish any reasonable
expectation of privacy over their whereabouts essentially at any given time.
Until the Supreme Court addresses this issue, the government is free to
continue employing these devices without probable cause and a warrant.268
Requiring the government to obtain a warrant before using these devices will
preserve the protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment without
overburdening law enforcement, since exceptions to the warrant requirement are
few and far between.
Advances in technology continue to flourish. The negative implications of
not addressing this issue are enormous.269 Among those negative implications
includes the feeling of being constantly watched or under 24-hour surveillance.
As Justice Douglas bluntly put it, “We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy,
where everyone is open to surveillance at all times; where there are no secrets
from government.”270 Without revisiting the question left unanswered in Jones,
the Supreme Court allows law enforcement to expose the gap in Fourth
Amendment case law through advanced surveillance techniques.271 Until this
question is answered—Big Brother is watching!

267. Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014).
268. Supra Part IV (arguing why the Fourth Circuit’s approach was correct).
269. Supra Part IV (illustrating the issues surrounding advanced technology and the negative implications
of not addressing them).
270. Andrews, No. 1496, 2016 WL 1254567 at *16 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
271. Supra Part IV (arguing the harm resulting from the Supreme Court’s failure to revisit the question
left unanswered in Jones).
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